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HOLLYWOOD GOES INTERACTIVE:
LICENSING PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH




Hollywood is waking up to a new form of entertainment - one that
is proving to be more profitable than motion pictures In an industry that
resists change, it is remarkable how quickly movie studios and individual
artists alike are scrambling to review their contracts to ensure that they will
not be left out of the new "game."2  This new area, the interactive
videogame, utilizes the newest technology offered by interactive multimedia
CD-ROM.
3
* Attorney, Business & Legal Affairs, Philips Interactive Media. J.D., magna cum laude,
Southwestern University School of Law, 1994; B.S.B.A., cum laude, University of Missouri-
Columbia, 1991. The author would like to thank Professor Robert C. Lind, Jr. for his teachings
and enthusiasm and Gary L. Fuller, Ph.D., for his insightful comments and guidance throughout
the years.
1. See John Bodie & Andy Marx, Two Can Play This Game; Agents and Studios Face Off
in New Contest for Videogame Profits, VARiETY, Dec. 27, 1993, at I ('Domestically, videogames
generated between $5 billion and $7 billion, while total U.S. box office for features was closer
to $5 billion."). In fact, while Michael Crichton received $2 million for the motion picture rights
in his novel Jurassic Park, he received close to double that amount for the interactive rights. Id.
2. All of the major motion picture studios have established interactive departments: Disney
Interactive, Time Warner Interactive, Fox Interactive, Universal Interactive, Sony Imagesoft, and
Paramount Interactive. See, e.g., Amy Harmon, Disney to get Interactive with Start of New
Division, L.A. TIMEs, Dec. 5, 1994, at Dl. In addition, all of the large entertainment agencies,
including International Creative Management, William Morris Agency, United Talent Agency, and
Creative Artists Agency, have established new departments to deal with interactive rights. Bodie
& Marx, supra note 1, at 1.
3. Interactive is defined as "[p]ertaining to a program or system that alternately accepts input
and then responds." IBM DICIONARY OF COMPUTING 349 (George McDaniel, 10th ed. 1993).
Multimedia is defined as "[miaterial presented in a combination of text, graphics, video,
animation, and sound." Id. at 444. Interactive Multimedia is defined as a "[slynonym for
interactive media." Id at 349. Interactive Media is defined as a "[m]edia that derives input from
the viewer to determine the content and duration of a message, thus making possible
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Videogames, once scorned by the entertainment industry, will likely
become huge money making projects for the motion picture studios.4 Ten
years ago, home videogames were jerky blips on a screen with a few
sounds.' Today, with the creation of interactive multimedia CD-ROM,
home videogames have advanced to include digitized stereo sound,
digitized film clips, and storylines similar to, if not based upon, fast action-
adventure motion pictures.6 This new technology has provided Hollywood
movie makers with vast opportunities to collaborate with videogame
developers and develop games based on past or future feature films.
This article will analyze the licensing problems encountered when a
motion picture studio attempts to "re-purpose"' a motion picture into an
interactive videogame, i.e., develop a feature film into an interactive
videogame using various film clips and sounds from the motion picture in
individualized program material." Id. See also Michael D. Scott & James N. Talbott, Interactive
Multimedia: What Is It, Why Is It Important and What Do I Need to Know About It?, 11
CompuTR/LJ. 585 (1991).
4. "Hollywood is... taking notice. Studios that once regarded videogames as a licensing
opportunity about as important as T-shirts are creating game divisions and bringing game
designers in on the ground floor of important new movies." Jonathan Weber, Video Games Go
to the Movies, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 21, 1993, at Dl. "It's changed from being a toy business to
being an interactive entertainment business .... There are now technology and marketing ties
with music, music videos, motion pictures and television." Id. (quoting Olaf Olafsson, President
of Sony Electronic Publishing).
5. Id. ("Video games were [once] created by computer programmers, and their crude, jerky,
cartoonish images more closely resembled a preschooler's painting than a Hollywood film.").
6. For example, Sony Pictures' The Last Action Hero, a fast action-adventure motion picture,
has been re-purposed into an action-adventure interactive videogame. Id.
7. This article will focus only on the development of interactive videogames in connection
with motion pictures developed separately from the interactive videogame, where a game utilizes
actual film clips and sounds from an independently created film. The article will not discuss the
situation where game developers and producers produce their own film and sound for an
interactive videogame.
Not only has this new technology offered motion picture makers an opportunity to develop
interactive videogames from existing motion pictures, the reverse also is proving true. Deals are
currently being struck with interactive videogame developers to acquire motion picture rights in
interactive videogames, providing Hollywood with new movies based on existing videogames.
See, e.g., Van Damme's Video Connection, WASH. POST, Apr. 29, 1994, at C6 (discussing
Universal Pictures' release of a thirty-six million dollar motion picture based on the videogame
Street Fighter); Lancit Media Obtains Exclusive Motion Picture, TV and Home Video Rights to
Best-Selling Computer Game "Lemmings, " Bus. WIRE, Dec. 1, 1993, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Cumws File. Given this fact, "writers are facing a chicken-and-egg question: Which
deal comes first, the videogame or the feature?" Bodie & Marx, supra note 1, at 1. The article
pointed out that if a motion picture deal is cut first, and a major star is attached to the movie, the
interactive rights would be worth a larger amount of money. Id.
8. "Re-purposing" is a term of art used to describe the process of transforming a preexisting
work into a new form of media.
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the new game.9 Regardless of whether a studio has an "in-house"
development department or licenses the right to an independent videogame
developer, a paramount question must be answered before the videogame
may be developed and distributed to consumers: Does the motion picture
studio own, or has it licensed, all the rights necessary to develop an
interactive videogame based on a preexisting motion picture?"
The problems associated with the scope of licensed copyrights, when
there is an expansion of technology, will inevitably affect the development
of an interactive videogame from a preexisting film. These problems will
arise unless attorneys have carefully contracted specifically for the rights
necessary to reproduce, distribute, and perhaps perform the copyrighted
work in an interactive multimedia videogame. Given that this technology
is extremely new and many potential "videogame movies" have been in
existence for many years, it is highly unlikely that a studio contracted
specifically for the interactive multimedia rights. Thus, both parties to the
original film contract will have to look to current copyright and contract
law on the subject of expansion of technology and licenses, to determine
if the assignor, or licensor, "gave away" her rights to interactive video-
games when she assigned or licensed her rights for the motion picture.
This article will discuss the current law covering the expansion of
technology in relation to licensed copyrights, and assist the reader in
determining whether a grant of rights for a motion picture encompasses
interactive multimedia rights.
Although there have been numerous cases on the subject of expansion
of technology and licensing, none have fully delineated a comprehensive
approach to be utilized with future licensing disputes concerning expanding
technology. This article organizes the different approaches and factors that
the courts have used, and applies them to the subject of whether a typical
9. Similar questions and problems present themselves when a motion picture company
attempts to re-purpose a motion picture into an interactive motion picture. The question of
whether a motion picture license would cover such a use is beyond the scope of this article.
However, this author asserts that this question is more debatable than whether a typical motion
picture license should allow for interactive videogames. It is arguable that the "new" use of
interactive motion pictures is not really a new use, but just a new medium. The two uses may
arguably be the same. It is this author's opinion that the re-purposing of motion pictures into
interactive motion pictures is similar to the past move from silent motion pictures to "talking"
motion pictures, and thus offers no new use and no substantive re-purposing. See discussion infra
part UI.A. and IV.C.
10. Most contracts between the studio and content providers are different and include
different contractual language. Therefore, this article will focus on the general problems that may
be encountered when a studio attempts to re-purpose a motion picture into an interactive
multimedia videogame.
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grant of motion picture rights covers interactive multimedia rights. While
all licenses are different in their exact contractual language, many common
principles apply to all licenses when interpreting the scope of rights granted
with subsequent expansion of technology. Part II of this article discusses
the general principles of licensing motion pictures and interactive
videogames." Part III addresses several of the past problems in the
licenses of motion picture rights when there was a later expansion of
technology.1 2 Part IV asserts that, generally, motion picture rights should
not include the rights necessary to produce interactive multimedia
videogames and discusses the several reasons for that conclusion.
1 3
11. BASIC PRINCIPLES GOVERNING THE LICENSING OF
MOTION PICTURE RIGHTS
Most motion pictures are derivative works 4 based on preexisting
copyrighted screenplays or novels.' 5 Thus, the producer of a film must
obtain a license from the owner of the copyright in the preexisting work to
use the novel or screenplay in the motion picture.' 6 Furthermore, motion
pictures almost always have accompanying music, requiring the producers
of a film wishing to use preexisting music to first obtain a synchronization
right'7 ("synch right") which enables them to use the music in the motion
picture.'" Therefore, producers wishing to utilize preexisting works must
11. See discussion infra part II.
12. See discussion infra part LII.
13. See discussion infra part IV.
14. A derivative work "is a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a
translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version... or any
other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1990).
15. However, it is also possible that the motion picture is a joint work with the screenplay.
A joint work is defined as "a work prepared by two or more authors with the intention that their
contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole." 17 U.S.C.
§ 101 (1990). However, the usual industry practice is that the various contributors are contractual
employees of the producer or the producers license the preexisting works, thus precluding the
work from being a joint work. See, e.g., CRAIG JOYCE ET AL., COPYRIGHT LAW § 3.02[D], at
170 (2d ed. 1991).
16. If the producer fails to obtain a license or right to utilize the underlying copyrighted
work, she will have infringed that underlying work. See 17 U.S.C. § 501 (1990).
17. A synch right is the "right to reproduce the music onto the sound track of a film or a
videotape in synchronization with the action." Buffalo Broadcasting Co. v. Am. Soc'y of
Composers, Authors and Publishers, 744 F.2d 917, 920 (2d Cir. 1984). See also Broadcast
Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 33 n.23 (1979) ("The 'synch' right
is the right to record a copyrighted song in synchronization with the film or videotape ... .
18. See supra note 16.
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obtain many assignments, or licenses, of the fights necessary to utilize the
works in the new motion picture.
Similarly, an interactive videogame based on a preexisting motion
picture is also likely to be a derivative work. 9 Thus, when an interactive
videogame developer wishes to create an interactive videogame from a
preexisting motion picture, the developer must obtain a license, or licenses,
from the motion picture studio or from whomever holds the final fights in
the motion picture to enable her to use the preexisting motion picture in the
new game.2°
However, at this point, the careful developer should not presume that
she holds all the necessary licenses to produce and distribute her game -
the developer must carefully determine whether the motion picture studio
holds all interactive fights in all preexisting works embodied in the motion
picture to enable those preexisting works to be subsequently re-purposed
into interactive videogames. If the motion picture studio did not obtain a
license that would allow the preexisting work to be re-purposed into an
interactive videogame, the studio, afortiori, could not transfer such a fight
to the videogame developer. Therefore, all interactive videogame
developers should further investigate the licenses to determine whether the
motion picture company secured all the necessary fights in the preexisting
works for interactive videogames. If the motion picture company was
unable to transfer the necessary interactive rights, the videogame developer
must directly contact the owner of the preexisting work to secure all
necessary rights. Part IV of this article will discuss the different theories
and factors that courts utilize when deciding whether the scope of a license
covers a re-purposed use.
2'
19. It is also possible that an interactive videogame is a joint work with the screenplay of
a movie. See supra note 15. However, as with motion pictures, the various contributors most
likely would be contractual employees of the producers of the interactive videogame or the
producers would license the pre-existing works, thus precluding the work from being ajoint work.
See JOYCE Er AL., supra note 15, § 3.02[D], at 170.
20. This article is written in terms of a videogame developer who is independent of any
motion picture studio developing an interactive videogame based on a preexisting motion picture.
However, when an "in-house" developer, one who is employed directly by a studio, is developing
the videogame, the dilemma is still present. There, the motion picture studio must still make sure
that any licenses procured covering preexisting works allow the specific new use of interactive
videogames.
21. See discussion infra part IV.
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III. PAST LICENSING PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH EXPANSION OF
TECHNOLOGY AND THE RIGHTS TO PRODUCE MOTION PICTURES
To date, there have been three litigated situations in which there was
a serious debate over whether a license given to produce motion pictures
also included the right to re-purpose the work into a different medium.'
A. Right to Produce Talking Motion Pictures
The "talking" motion picture was the first example of how subse-
quently developed technology affected motion picture licenses.' This
issue arose during the silent movie era when a licensor assigned the
necessary rights in a copyright to produce a motion picture.24 When
technology allowed for talking movies, many licensors of silent movies
claimed that the rights they assigned did not cover this new use, unless
expressly provided for at the time of the license However, licensees
generally asserted that their licenses covered talking motion pictures
because the use was not a new use, and therefore was not a re-purposed
work.26 By arguing that the talking motion picture was not a re-purposed
work, the licensees asserted that the court did not have to reach the ultimate
issue of whether the "new" use was allowed under the original license,
22. See 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 10.10[B],
at 10-87 (1994) (listing of the various problems associated with technological developments in
the communication media).
23. See, e.g., Murphy v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 112 F.2d 746 (9th Cir. 1940)
(assignment of motion picture and sound rights held to include the right to produce "talking"
motion pictures); L.C. Page & Co. v. Fox Film Corp., 83 F.2d 196 (2d Cir. 1936) (license of
exclusive motion picture rights held to include "talking" motion picture rights); Kirke La Shelle
Co. v. Paul Armstrong Co., 188 N.E. 163 (N.Y. 1933) (license of dramatic rights of a play held
not to encompass "talking" motion picture rights).
24. See, e.g., Murphy, 112 F.2d at 747; LC. Page & Co., 83 F.2d at 197-98; Kirke La Shelle
Co., 188 N.E. at 164.
25. See, e.g., Murphy, 112 F.2d at 747; LC. Page & Co., 83 F.2d at 199; Kirke La Shelle
Co., 188 N.E. at 165. For illustrative purposes, one case is worth discussing in order to
demonstrate the typical claims of both parties in this specific context. In Murphy, the licensee
assigned "all of the motion picture rights" and the "exclusive, complete, and entire motion picture
rights .... " Murphy, 112 F.2d at 747 n.1. The plaintiff claimed his license did not cover this
new use. In concluding the license covered talking motion pictures, the unanimous court reasoned
that the licensor assigned its entire motion picture rights. Id. at 747. The court explained that
the right to sound in a motion picture is within the general motion picture rights. Il Therefore,
because the licensor assigned its entire motion picture rights, that license necessarily covered the
inclusive right to talking motion pictures. lId
26. See, e.g., Murphy, 112 F.2d at 747; LC. Page & Co., 83 F.2d at 198-99; Kirke La Shelle
Co., 188 N.E. at 165. See also discussion infra part IV.C.
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because the use, telling a story through a motion picture, remained the
same: "a motion picture is a motion picture"'27 and adding sound did not
change that fact.2' Usually, courts sided with the licensees, and held that
these licenses did cover this subsequent "new" use.29
B. Right to Televise
Subsequent to the talking motion picture, the advent of television was
the next development in technology that spumed controversy over licensed
motion picture rights." Specifically, the controversy focused on whether
a motion picture license, drafted at a time when television had not yet been
invented, allowed the subsequent televising of the motion picture."1
Licensors asserted that they could not have granted the right to televise
because, at the time of the license, no such use existed. 2 Licensees, on
the other hand, argued that the "new" use of televising was not a new use,
but was merely a new way of exhibiting or disseminating the work to the
public.3" Courts are split on this issue.'
C. Right to Produce Videocassettes
The third example of licensing and the effect of new technology that
caused litigation was the development of the home videocassette recorder
("VCR"), which, more importantly, led to many motion pictures being
released in videocassette form."5 This relatively recent debate over
27. Murphy, 112 F.2d at 749.
28. See supra note 25.
29. See supra note 23.
30. See, e.g., Bartsch v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 391 F.2d 150 (2d Cir. 1968)
(assignment granting the right to copyright, vend, license, and exhibit a motion picture included
the right to televise the motion picture); Ettore v. Philco Television Broadcasting Corp., 229 F.2d
481 (3rd Cir. 1956) (holding that television was a new use compared to that of motion pictures,
and that the plaintiff should not be deemed to have granted a use not in existence and not
contemplated by either party at the time of contracting).
31. See Bartsch, 391 F.2d at 152; Ettore, 229 F.2d at 483.
32. Bartsch, 391 F.2d at 152.
33. Ia at 154.
34. See supra note 30.
35. See, e.g., Rey v. Lafferty, 990 F.2d 1379 (1st Cir. 1993) (license of right to produce
films for television did not encompass distribution by videocassette); Cohen v. Paramount
Pictures, Inc., 845 F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 1988) (license to exhibit motion picture by means of
television did not allow for the new use of exhibition by videocassettes); Abkco Music, Inc. v.
Westminster Music, Ltd., 838 F. Supp. 153 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (whether license of all rights in
musical composition permitted licensees to exploit new technologies through videocassettes was
an issue for jury); Philadelphia Orchestra Ass'n v. Walt Disney Co., 821 F. Supp. 341 (E.D. Pa.
1993) (issue of fact existed regarding whether a license to use recordings in connection with a
1995]
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whether motion picture licenses covered the release of motion pictures on
videocassette has caused the most litigation over the scope of motion
picture licenses.36 Licensors argued that motion picture licenses could not
allow for exhibition by videocassette because this new use was vastly
different from the previous use of exhibition by motion picture.37
Licensees, in addition to arguing that the two uses were similar, often
found protection in the sweeping language of their license which attempted
to include all benefits from technological advancements.38 This area
continues to produce litigation today, in light of the many films that are
being released in video form daily." Again, courts are split on this
issue.'
IV. DOES THE RIGHT TO PRODUCE A MOTION PICTURE INCLUDE THE
RIGHT TO PRODUCE INTERACrIVE MULTIMEDIA VIDEOGAMES?
A. Ascertainable Intent of the Parties
When determining the scope of a license, the most important factor
is the intent of the parties.4 A license of rights is basically a contract
feature picture allowed such use in connection with reproduction of that film in videocassette);
Bourne Co. v. Walt Disney Co., 1992 Copyright L. Dec. (CCH) [ 26, 934 (S.D.N.Y. 1992),
rev'd on other grounds; Bourne Co. v. Tower Records, Inc., 976 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1992) (license
of right to record song in synchronization with motion picture held not to include right to
reproduce in videocassette form); Platinum Record Co. v. Lucasfilm, Ltd., 556 F. Supp. 226
(D.N.J. 1983) (license to exhibit, exploit, market and perform motion picture by any means or
methods now or hereafter known held to allow exhibition by videocassette); Rooney v. Columbia
Pictures Indus., Inc., 538 F. Supp. 211 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (license to exhibit motion picture without
limitation and with clause stating that future technological advances would inure to benefit
licensee held to include exhibition by videocassette); Tele-Pac, Inc. v. Grainger, 570 N.Y.S.2d
521 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991) (license to distribute motion pictures for broadcast by television did
not encompass exhibition by videocassette).
36. See cases cited supra note 35.
37. See Rey, 990 F.2d at 1387; Cohen, 845 F.2d at 853; Bourne Co., 1992 Copyright L. Dec.
(CCH) 9 25, 433; Tele-Pac, Inc., 570 N.Y.S.2d at 524.
38. See Rooney, 538 F. Supp. at 213, Platinum Record Co., 566 F. Supp. at 227. See also
discussion part IV.F.1. (discussing effect of future advance clauses).
39. One recent case in California involving this situation was the 1991 lawsuit brought by
Peggy Lee, a singer and writer of several songs which were used in the motion picture Lady and
the Tramp, against Walt Disney Co. Sharon Bernstein, The Lady and the Lawsuit, L.A. TIMES,
Feb. 19, 1991, at Fl. Ms. Lee triumphed in her suit and won a $2.3 million judgment. See also
Richard Harrington, On the Beat: Reproductive Rights, WASH. PoST, June 10, 1992, at B7.
40. See supra note 35.
41. In determining the scope of licenses, "courts have sought at the outset to identify any
indicia of a mutual general intent to apportion rights to 'new uses,' insofar as such general intent
can be discerned from the language of the license, the surrounding circumstances, and trade
INTERACTIVE LTCENSING
between the two parties.42 Thus, if the intent of the parties regarding the
scope of a license is ascertainable, this intent will control.43
Because we are dealing with new uses, which became possible
through new technology developed subsequent to the drafting of a license,
it is unusual to have a license drafted so that the parties' intent is
unambiguous as to whether the scope of that license covers a specific new
use.' Thus, most licenses are ambiguous as to their scope in covering
new technological uses.45 When faced with the question of whether a
license is ambiguous as to the intent of the parties, courts use one of two
different methods.' Under the first method, courts constrain the parties
to the four comers of the document when attempting to establish the
existence of an ambiguity.47 Under the second approach, courts generally
allow the parties to establish the existence of the ambiguity through the use
of extrinsic parol evidence.48
usage." Rey v. Lafferty, 990 F.2d 1379, 1387 (1st Cir. 1993) (emphasis in original).
42. See, e.g., NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 22, § 10.08, at 10-71 ("Principles of contract
law are generally applicable in the construction of copyright assignments, licenses and other
transfers of rights.").
43. See; e.g., Philadelphia Orchestra Ass'n v. Walt Disney Co., 821 F. Supp. 341,345 (E.D.
Pa. 1993) ('The fundamental rule in construing a contract is to ascertain and give effect to the
intention of the parties, as expressed in the language of the contract"). See also NIMMER &
NIMMER, supra note 22, § 10.08, at 10-72 ('The task in contract construction is, where possible,
to effectuate the intent of the parties.").
44. NIMER & NMMER, supra note 22, § 10.10[B], at 10-92. See also infra note 53. But
see James W. Dabney, Licenses and New Technology: Apportioning and Benefits, in ALI-ABA
COURSE OF STUDY: TRADEMARKS, COPYRIGHTS, AND UNFAIR COMPETITION UNDER REcENT
LAW REVISIONS AND DEcISIONS, 90 (1991) ("On occasion, courts have found that licenses
expressly provide[ ] for the eventuality of new- technology or media.... (citing Platinum
Record Co. v. Lucasfilm, Ltd., 566 F. Supp. 226 (D.N.J. 1983)).
45. See, e.g., NMMR & NIMMER, supra note 22, § 10.10[B], at 10-87.
46. NIMMER & NIMMR, supra note 22, § 10.10[B], at 10-92 (under California law, extrinsic
evidence is allowed to prove a reasonably susceptible meaning). See also Dabney, supra note
44, at 89 (under New York law, evidence extrinsic to the agreement may not be considered).
47. "'[Mjatters extrinsic to the agreement may not be considered when the intent of the
parties can be gleaned from the face of the instrument."' Dabney, supra note 44, at 89, (citing
Chimart Assoc. v. Paul, 489 N.E.2d 231, 233 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986) (quoting Teitelbaum
Holdings, Ltd. v. Gold, 396 N.E.2d 1029 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979))).
48. See, e.g., NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 22, § 10.08, at 10-73. In California, extrinsic
evidence is allowed to prove an ambiguity, regardless of whether the meaning is ascertainable
from the contract itself.
Under California law, the test of admissibility of extrinsic evidence to explain the
meaning of a written instrument is not whether it appears to the court to be plain
and unambiguous on its face, but whether the offered evidence is relevant to prove
a meaning to which the language of the contract is reasonably susceptible.
NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 22, § 10.08, at 10-73 n.12 (quoting Barrs Indus., Inc. v.
Worldvision Enters., Inc., 875 F.2d 1446, 1450 (9th Cir. 1989)).
1995]
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Once the existence of an ambiguity is established, some courts allow
the parties to introduce evidence of custom in the industry to help ascertain
the intent of the parties on the scope of a license.49 However, given that
the subject matter concerns technology that did not exist at the time of
drafting, the custom of the industry is seldom helpful in ascertaining the
parties' intent because the industry has not had the opportunity to develop
a custom concerning the newly developed technological use. 0 Addi-
tionally, a few courts have allowed parties to attempt to define the scope
of a license by using evidence of past dealings between the parties to
establish their intent.5 However, as was the case with custom, past
dealings usually provide little assistance when attempting to ascertain intent
because the new use in question did not exist at the time of the execution
of the license, and thus could not have been the subject of past nego-
tiations."
Most often, in cases involving a subsequently developed technological
use, there is no single intent of the parties, if intent ever existed at all.53
49. See, e.g., Rey v. Lafferty, 990 F.2d 1379, 1387-88 (1st Cir. 1993); Abkco Music Inc. v.
Westminster Music Ltd., 838 F. Supp. 153, 156 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Murphy v. Warner Bros.
Pictures, 112 F.2d 746, 748 (9th Cir. 1940). Early on, in these types of disputes, courts allowed
evidence of custom in the industry to help define the scope of a license. Murphy, 112 F.2d at
748. In Murphy, the court allowed evidence of custom in determining whether a license of
motion picture rights included rights to produce "talking" motion pictures. Id. ("It is almost
universally recognized ... that trades custom with reference to meaning of terms used in the
contract entered into by persons engaged in that trade is admissible in evidence to explain the
meaning of the contract.").
50. It is possible for the usage of trade to be probative by establishing a custom of the
industry in allowing a certain party to the license to always benefit from a newly developed use.
However, the leading authority in the field cautions that:
Contracts regarding copyrighted works typically arise not in a vacuum, but in the
context of ongoing industries to exploit copyrights. Therefore, evidence of the
custom and practice of those industries frequently helps to shed light on that intent.
Nonetheless, it must be borne in mind that industry custom itself is often fraught
with ambiguity.
NIMER & NIMMER, supra note 22, § 10.08, at 10-73.
51. See, e.g., Bartsch v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 391 F.2d 150, 154 (2d Cir. 1968);
Philadelphia Orchestra Ass'n v. Walt Disney Co., 821 F. Supp. 341, 346 (E.D. Pa. 1993). See
also Dabney, supra note 44, at 95 ("negotiation history of a license may reveal a number of
things about its intended meaning").
52. Past dealings or negotiations may prove helpful on the bigger picture of whether a
license should be read broadly to include all new uses or read narrowly to exclude all new uses.
See discussion infra part IV.D.
53. It has also been stated that:
Most often in fact there is no such single intent. Either each party had a
different intent with respect to the disputed issue of scope, or more likely, there
simply was no intent at all at the time of execution with respect to this issue insofar
as it relates to whether the grant includes a new use developed at a later time. The
very fact that we are most often dealing with a later developed technological
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While it is possible that both parties had a different intent as to the scope
of the license at the time of execution, it is more likely that there existed
no intent at all at the time of the execution of the license because the
contested license relates to a subsequently developed use, which neither
party contemplated when entering the original license.5
4
In the case of interactive videogames, it is doubtful that either party
had the specific intent that a motion picture license would someday include
such a new use. Parties to a license executed ten to twenty years ago most
likely could not have imagined such a new use of their copyrighted
work.5' However, a party could argue that she intended a broad license
which would allow for such a use, not because that party contemplated that
specific use, but because she intended on securing a license broad enough
for all future technological changes.56 The issue of intent is clearly a case
specific issue, and therefore will be argued on the specific facts at hand.
Since courts generally cannot ascertain the intent of the parties from the
document itself or other extrinsic evidence, it is important to look to other
factors and approaches that courts utilize when determining whether the
scope of a license covers a subsequently developed use.
5 7
B. The Contrasting Approaches to Licenses and
Expansion of Technology
If the intent of the parties regarding the scope of a license is not
ascertainable, courts have essentially used one of two approaches advanced
by Professor Melville Nimmer:58 one favoring licensors and one favoring
licensees.5 9 Under the first approach, absent contrary intent, a court will
process ... suggests that the parties' ambiguous phraseology masks an absence of
intent rather than a hidden intent which the court must "find."
NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 22, § 10.10[B], at 10-91 to 10-92.
54. The author acknowledges that these two positions are not mutually exclusive. It is
possible that the parties to a license had a general intent as to the scope of a license, i.e., very
broad versus narrowly tailored, but each party had no specific intent as to the specific newly
developed use. In this case, a court must distinguish between the two intents when relying on
one to support a decision.
55. See supra note 53.
56. See supra note 54.
57. "Where no reliable indicia of general intent are discernible... courts have resorted to
one of several interpretive methods to resolve the issue on policy grounds." Rey, 990 F.2d at
1388 (emphasis in original).
58. Professor Melville Nimmer is the co-author of the copyright treatise entitled NIMMR ON
COPYRIGHT. NMMR & NammR, supra note 22.
59. See NIMER & NIMMER, supra note 22, § 10.10[B], at 10-92 to 10-93. These
approaches to the construction of the license apply only when the court is unable to ascertain the
exact intent of the parties from either the document itself or from extrinsic evidence. See, e.g.,
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construe a license to include "only such uses as fall within the unambig-
uous core meaning of the term... and exclude any uses which lie within
the ambiguous penumbra ... ."60 Thus, a court will interpret the contract
to reserve any rights not expressly or unambiguously granted.61  This
approach favors the licensor or original author. Under the second
approach, absent contrary intent, "the licensee may properly pursue any
uses that may reasonably be said to fall within the medium as described in
the license."'62 This pro-licensee approach, often called the "preferred
approach,"63 allows the licensee to re-purpose the licensed work in any
medium that the language of the license could reasonably and ambiguously
allow. Therefore, if the license could reasonably be read to allow such a
use, that use is permitted under the license.'
1. The Pro-Licensor Approach
Cohen v. Paramount Pictures Corp.6' follows the first approach of
favoring the licensor.66 In Cohen, the Ninth Circuit held that a 1969
Dabney, supra note 44, at 95-96 (approaches apply if the license is determined to be ambiguous
and if extrinsic evidence is unavailable). See also Allen R. Grogan, Licensing for Next
Generation New Media Technology, COMPUTER LAW, Nov. 1993, at 1.
It is the author's opinion that the current two-approach system can be said to encourage
forum shopping and inconsistent rulings. The Ninth Circuit, following the pro-licensor approach,
will undoubtedly attract plaintiff licensors. See infra notes 65-77 and accompanying text. On the
other hand, the Second Circuit, following the pro-licensee approach, will be desirable to defendant
licensees. See infra notes 79-82 and accompanying text. The author asserts that the outcome of
most license scope-cases hinges more on the specific forum and the approach utilized, rather than
on the exact merits of each case. Until there is a uniform approach, this will continue to be the
case.
60. NMHAER & NIMMER, supra note 22, § 10.10-B], at 10-92.
61. Id. ("[a]ny rights not expressly [in this case meaning unambiguously] granted are
reserved").
62. Id. at 10-92 to 10-93.
63. The pro-licensee alternative is "the one which it is believed is to be preferred.
NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 22, § 10.10[B], at 10-92 (citing Bartsch v. Metro-Goldwyn-
Mayer, Inc., 391 F.2d 150 (2d Cir. 1968) (Treatise quoted); Landon v. Twentieth Century-Fox
Film Corp., 384 F. Supp. 450 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (Treatise quoted)); see also Rey v. Lafferty, 990
F.2d 1379, 1388 (1st Cir. 1993) (discussing the "preferred," pro-licensee, approach).
In Bartsch, the court stated that the pro-licensee approach was preferred because it allows
for greater dissemination of the copyrighted work, while the pro-licensor approach might prevent
the work from ever being disseminated through a new medium. Bartsch, 391 F.2d at 155.
64. NIMmER & NIMMER, supra note 22, § 10.10[B], at 10-93 (The license may pursue any
use "within the ambiguous penumbra because if whether or not a given use falls within the
description of the medium is ambiguous it must, by definition mean that it is within the medium
in a reasonable sense .... ").
65. 845 F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 1988).
66. Id.
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"synch license"'67 did not confer the right to reproduce a composition in
a reproduction of the film in videocassette form.6' Although the court did
not expressly articulate that it was following this specific approach, it is
apparent throughout, the court's reasoning that it was.69  The particular
license in Cohen allowed the defendant to perform the composition through
exhibition of the motion picture both in theaters and on television. °
However, the court held that the license did not confer the rights to exhibit
through videocassettes because the two uses were so different.71 This
allowed "only such uses as fall within the unambiguous core meaning of
the term."
72
The court in Cohen reasoned that if it were to broadly construe a
license to cover mediums not ascertainable at the time of execution, it
would be allowing licensees to "'reap the entire windfall' associated with
the new medium.' 73 The court also stated in support of this approach that
"the license must be construed in accordance with the purpose underlying
federal copyright law"74 of granting "valuable, enforceable rights to
authors, publishers, etc ..... 75 Therefore, the court "would frustrate the
purposes of the Act were [it] to construe [the] license - with its limiting
language - as granting a right in a medium that had not been introduced
to the domestic market at the time the parties entered into the agree-
ment."76 Thus, the Ninth Circuit appears to be following this pro-licensor
approach.77
67. See supra note 17.
68. Cohen, 845 F.2d at 855.
69. See id at 854 (holding that the motion picture license did not allow a new use of
exhibiting by videocassette because it would not protect the author to allow a new use that was
not contemplated at the time of the execution of the license); see also Grogan, supra note 59, at
5 ("Cohen follows the approach that assumes that a grant extends only to uses that are
unambiguously within the core meaning of the term").
70. Cohen, 845 F.2d at 853.
71. Id. at 855.
72. NIMMER & NIMER, supra note 22, § 10.10[B], at 10-92.
73. Cohen, 845 F.2d at 854 (citing Neil S. Nagano, Comment, Past Copyright Licenses and
the New Video Software Medium, 29 UCLA. L. REV. 1160, 1184 (1982)).
74. Cohen, 845 F.2d at 854.
75. Ld. (quoting Washingtonian Publishing Co. v. Pearson, 306 U.S. 30, 36 (1939)); see also
id. ("Ihe essence of a copyright protection is the protection of originality rather than novelty or
invention" (quoting Scott v. WKTG, Inc., 376 F.2d 467, 469 (7th Cir. 1967))).
76. Id
77. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 759 F. Supp. 1444, 1451 (N.D. Cal. 1991)
("[D]istrict courts [are] to interpret copyright licenses narrowly, consistent with the federal
copyright policy of providing incentives in the form of copyright protection to authors"). But
see Murphy v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 112 F.2d 746 (9th Cir. 1940) (holding "talking" motion
pictures did not constitute new use compared to silent motion pictures).
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Following this pro-licensor approach, a license to use a pre-existing
work in a motion picture would not allow for a re-purpose of that work
into an interactive videogame, unless the contract specifically provided for
it. It is difficult to legitimately argue that a license covering motion picture
rights also includes, within its "unambiguous core meaning," the use of that
work in the form of an interactive videogame due to their apparent
differences." This is especially true if the original motion picture license
was executed at a time when technology did not allow for such a use.
2. The Pro-Licensee Approach
A case that illustrates the pro-licensee approach is Bartsch v. Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc.79 In Bartsch, a plaintiff brought suit to enjoin an
assignee of motion picture rights in a play from allowing the motion picture
to be exhibited on television. 0 In holding that the assignment of motion
picture rights covered the new use of television, the court stated:
If the words [in the license] are broad enough to cover the new
use, it seems fairer that the burden of framing and negotiating
an exception should fall on the grantor; if Bartsch or his
assignors had desired to limit "exhibition" of the motion picture
to the conventional method where light is carried from a
While no federal circuit courts other than the Ninth Circuit have had a published opinion
leaning toward the first approach, the First Circuit has stated that, in some instances, the pro-
licensor approach should be followed. In the case of Rey v. Lafferty, 990 F.2d 1379 (1st Cir.
1993), the court followed the pro-licensee approach but stated that the pro-licensor approach is
"particularly appropriate in situations which involve overreaching or exploitation of unequal
bargaining power by a licensee in negotiating the contract." Id. at 1388; see also discussion infra
part IV.E. It is also just as important to note that the court stated that "[lt may also be
appropriate [to follow the first approach] where a particular 'new use' was completely
unforeseeable and therefore could not possibly have formed part of the bargain between the
parties at the time of the original grant." Rey, 990 F.2d at 1388 (emphasis in original); see also
discussion infra part IV.D.
78. See discussion infra part IV.C. on differences between motion pictures and interactive
videogames.
79. 391 F.2d 150 (2d Cir. 1968).
80. The court looked to language in the assignment that gave the assignee "the right 'to
copyright, vend, license and exhibit such motion picture photoplays throughout the world."' Id.
at 153. The court specifically reasoned that this language included "the right... to 'exhibit' the
copyrighted motion picture by a telecast without a further grant by the copyright owner." Id.
It is interesting to note that this pro-licensee court recognized the fact that because the
issue concerns a new use brought about by technology, there was most likely no intent on the
particular use contested. See supra note 53. The court stated that, in the end, the "decision must
turn, as Professor Nimmer has suggested .... on a choice between two basic approaches more
than on an attempt to distill decisive meaning out of language that very likely had none."
Bartsch, 391 F.2d at 155.
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projector to a screen directly beheld by the viewer, they could
have said so.8
The court further reasoned that this approach, as applied to these facts,
would guarantee greater dissemination of the copyrighted work.82
Even if a court were to follow the "preferred approach '" '83 in deciding
whether a typical motion picture license should allow for a new use of
interactive videogames, the court would most likely find that it does not.
This is because the new use of the licensed copyright work in interactive
videogames is not a use which "may reasonably be said to fall within the
medium as described in the license." 84 It is not a reasonable proposition
to claim that the use of an interactive videogame is reasonably similar to
the use of motion pictures. When a licensor contemplates her copyrighted
work being utilized in a motion picture, it would be unreasonable to expect
that the licensor also contemplated that this granted right would allow the
licensee to then utilize the work in an interactive videogame. While it is
conceivable to hold that videocassette exhibition reasonably falls within the
scope of a typical motion picture license, it is inconceivable to hold that
interactive videogame exhibition reasonably falls within the same typical
license. The medium and purposes of motion pictures are entirely different
than those of interactive videogames. The purposes and use of each work,
as well as the method of presentation, are substantially different.85
In the case of interactive videogames, the purpose of the use or
medium is to both mentally and physically challenge the user of the game.
Additionally, with the interactive videogame, the viewer is actually an
active participant with the medium. Whereas with a motion picture, the
purpose of the use is to provide a type of mental relaxation and is designed
to require no participation from the viewer. While the two uses, and the
two mediums, are similar in that they are both designed to provide
entertainment, that is the extent of their similarities. Their methods of
providing entertainment differ significantly. If a court were to hold that the
81. Bartsch, 391 F.2d at 155. But see Rey v. Lafferty, 990 F.2d 1379, 1388 (1st Cir. 1993)
(in applying the preferred, pro-licensee approach, "the burden and risk of drafting licenses whose
language anticipates the possibility of any particular 'new use' are apportioned equally between
[the] licensor and licensee") (emphasis added).
82. Bartsch, 391 F.2d at 155. ("A further reason favoring the broader view in a case like this
is that it provides a single person who can make the copyrighted work available to the public over
the penumbral medium ... .
83. See supra note 63.
84. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 22, § 10.10[B], at 10-93.
85. See infra discussion part IV.C. (on the differences between motion pictures and
interactive videogames).
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uses are "reasonably similar," relying on the fact that the two mediums
both have entertainment purposes, the court, in essence, would be allowing
a motion picture licensee to hold a monopoly on a licensor's rights.8 6
C. Mere Improvement in Existing Use or New Technological Use
In determining whether a license encompasses a "new" use, courts
have occasionally looked to whether the "new" use is a mere improvement
in existing use or is a completely new use. 7 If a court determines that
the "new" use is a mere improvement in the existing use, the court will
usually construe the license to allow for the "new" use. 8  However, if a
court concludes that the "new" use is a complete transformation of the old
use, the court will not construe the license to allow for such a new use.89
This type of analysis was first demonstrated in a case covering a
license dispute over "talking" motion pictures.' ° In L.C. Page & Co. v.
Fox Film Corp.,91 the court rejected a licensor's claim that his license of
"exclusive moving picture rights" did not allow for the use of "talking"
86. But see Heather J. Meeker, Note, Multimedia and Copyright, 20 RuTGERS CoMPuTER
& TECH. L.J. 375, 397 (1994) (arguing that intellectual property law allows an author to engage
in monopolistic behavior by refusing to license his work).
87. See, e.g., Cohen v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 845 F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 1988) (comparison
of television versus videocassette display); L.C. Page & Co. v. Fox Film Corp., 83 F.2d 196 (2d
Cir. 1936) (comparison of talking motion pictures versus silent motion pictures); Bourne Co. v.
Walt Disney Co., 1992 Copyright L. Dec. (CCH) 26, 934 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), rev'd on other
grounds, Bourne Co. v. Tower Records, Inc., 976 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1992) (citing Tele-Pac, Inc.
v. Grainger); Tele-Pac, Inc. v. Grainger, 570 N.Y.S.2d 521 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991) (comparison
of television versus videocassette display). See also Dabney, supra note 44, at 93-94. ("If an
allegedly 'new' technology can be characterized as a mere improvement in a known technology,
as opposed to be an entirely new medium or means of exploitation, that can help establish that
the technology is encompassed by a license grant.").
"It has [also] been held, for example, that recording contracts made in the era of 78 rpm
discs encompassed the 'new' technology of long playing ('LP') vinyl records." Dabney, supra
note 44, at 93 (citing Gee v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 471 F. Supp. 600, 657-59 (E.D.
Pa. 1979); Granz v. Harris, 98 F. Supp. 906, 909-1000 (S.D.N.Y. 1951); Desmond v. 20th
Century Fox Record Corp., 321 N.Y.S.2d 45 (N.Y. App. Div. 1971)).
88. See, e.g., L.C. Page & Co., 83 F.2d at 199; Murphy v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 112
F.2d 746, 749 (9th Cir. 1940).
89. See Cohen, 845 F.2d at 854 (television and videocassette display have very little in
common) ; Tele-Pac, Inc., 570 N.Y.S.2d at 523 (broadcasting by television is an entirely different
concept and technology from that involved in playing a videocassette); Bourne Co. v. Walt
Disney Co., 1992 Copyright L. Dec. (CCH) 1 26, 934 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), rev'd on other grounds,
Bourne Co. v. Tower Records, Inc., 976 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1992) (that license of right to record
song in synchronization with motion picture does not include right to reproduce in videocassette
form). See also Dabney, supra note 44, at 94.
90. See LC. Page & Co., 83 F.2d at 197.
91. 83 F.2d 196 (2d Cir. 1936).
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motion pictures.' In support of allowing such a "new" use, the court
reasoned that "[tihe development of mechanism making it possible to
accompany the screen picture with the sound of spoken words was but an
improvement in the motion picture art."93 The court further explained that
sound in motion pictures was "nothing more than a forward step in the
same art,"'  and that "the form and area of exploitation were the
same."95 Thus, under this court's reasoning, a "new" use that is a mere
improvement in an existing use is allowable under an ambiguous license
agreement because the purpose and use remain the same.96
As for motion picture licenses and whether interactive videogames
may be an allowed use under an ambiguous license, it must then be
considered whether the "new" use is a mere improvement in the existing
use. Based on the specific language of the L.C. Page court, the two uses
are of a different "art," and their "form and area of exploitation" are
completely dissimilar. Apart from the fact that they are both designed to
entertain, the purposes behind the two uses are completely different. The
use or purpose of a motion picture is to tell a story to a non-participant
viewer, while that of an interactive videogame is to provide an active, ever-
changing mental and physical challenge to an individual viewer. While it
would be possible to argue that an interactive videogame is a mere
improvement of older "first generation" videogames, it is much more
difficult to argue that motion pictures and interactive videogames are even
part of the same "art," let alone assert that the latter is a mere improvement
of the former.
D. Ability of Parties to Have Contemplated the New Technology
One factor that many courts have discussed, when determining
whether a license covers a new technological use, is whether the parties to
the license could have contemplated the new technological use.' Even
92. Id. at 199.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. L.C. Page & Co., 83 F.2d at 199.
96. See id.
97. Rey v. Lafferty, 990 F.2d 1379 (lst Cir. 1993); Cohen v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 845
F.2d 851, 854 (9th Cir. 1988); Bartsch v. Metro-Goidwyn-Mayer, Inc., 391 F.2d 150 (2d Cir.
1968); Ettore v. Philco Television Broadcasting Corp., 229 F.2d 481 (3d Cir. 1956); L.C. Page
& Co. v. Fox Film Corp., 83 F.2d 196 (2d Cir. 1936); Philadelphia Orchestra Ass'n v. Walt
Disney Co., 821 F. Supp. 341 (E.D. Pa. 1993); Abkco Music, Inc. v. Westminster Music, Ltd.,
838 F. Supp. 153 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Kirke La Shelle Co. v. Paul Armstrong Co., 188 N.E. 163
(N.Y. 1933); see also Dabney, supra note 44, at 92-93.
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though courts are divided on the importance of this factor, many have
nevertheless discussed it when analyzing an ambiguous license." Indeed,
this has been the most frequently addressed factor of this highly contested
issue." Licensors claim that if the parties were totally unaware of the
new technological use or medium, no intent to transfer the rights accom-
panying its use was possible, and therefore, the license did not encompass
such a use."° Licensees counter by asserting that the new use should be
allowed as long as the possibility of it was commercially known.
101
Additionally, licensees argue that even though the parties may not have
contemplated this specific use, the intent to include such use was
incorporated by broadly drafting a license to cover all new uses or
mediums."° Regardless of the particular weight given to this factor, it
addresses the paramount question of who shall "reap the entire windfall"
of this uncontemplated new use. 03
One of the first cases to apply this factor was Kirke La Shelle Co. v.
Paul Armstrong Co."° La Shelle involved the motion picture license to
the dramatic rights of a play. 05 In determining that the license did not
encompass "talking" motion picture rights, the court relied principally on
the fact that "'talkies' were unknown commercially and were, therefore, not
in contemplation of the parties.""°  The court held that:
Since "talkies" were unknown at the time when the contract was
entered into, it cannot be said that "talkie" rights were within the
contemplation of the parties either as a subject for the transfer
98. Rey, 990 F.2d at 1386 (was not a decisive factor); Cohen, 845 F.2d at 854 (operated as
a decisive factor for the licensor); Bartsch, 391 F.2d at 154 (operated as a decisive factor for the
licensee); Ettore, 229 F.2d at 487 (operated as a decisive factor for the licensor); L.C. Page &
Co., 83 F.2d at 199 (was not a decisive factor); Philadelphia Orchestra Ass'n, 821 F. Supp. at
346 (operated as a decisive factor for the licensee); Abkco Music, Inc., 838 F. Supp. at 155 (was
not a decisive factor); Kirke La Shelle Co., 188 N.E. at 165 (operated as a decisive factor for the
licensor).
99. Rey, 990 F.2d at 1386; Cohen, 845 F.2d at 854; Bartsch, 391 F.2d at 154; Ettore, 229
F.2d at 487; L.C. Page & Co., 83 F.2d at 199; Philadelphia Orchestra Ass'n, 821 F. Supp. at
346; Abkco Music, Inc., 838 F. Supp. at 155; Kirke La Shelle Co., 188 N.E. at 165.
100. See Philadelphia Orchestra Ass'n, 821 F. Supp. at 346; Kirke La Shelle Co., 188 N.E.
at 166.
101. See, e.g., Bartsch, 391 F.2d at 154; L.C. Page & Co., 83 F.2d at 198-99.
102. See Bartsch, 391 F.2d at 154; LC. Page & Co., 83 F.2d at 198-99; Abkco Music, Inc.,
838 F. Supp. at 157.
103. See Cohen, 845 F.2d at 854.
104. 188 N.E. 163 (N.Y. 1933).
105. Id. at 164.
106. Id. at 165.
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of an interest therein to the appellant or as included in the
motion picture fights specifically excepted."t
Thus, this court found it paramount that, in order for a license to include
a later developed use not specifically referred to in the contract, that use
must have at least been commercially known at the time of the execution
of the license.'("
A few courts have followed the holding and reasoning of the La
Shelle court.1' 9 Most notably, due to its strict application of the La Shelle
rule, the Ninth Circuit in Cohen v. Paramount Pictures Corp. held that a
license allowing exhibition by television did not cover distribution of
videocassettes for home viewing.' The court stated that the primary
reason why the license could not be read to encompass such a new use was
that "VCRs for home use were not invented or known.., when the license
was executed."''
However, many courts appear to disapprove of the restrictive
interpretation that is given to a license under the La Shelle rule, and have
restricted La Shelle's applicability to only a few certain factual situ-
ations."' In fact, a few courts, while giving cursory analysis to the La
Shelle rule, have gone to great lengths to prove that knowledge of the
potential new use was, in fact, commercially known."3 The best example
of a court's attempt to limit the La Shelle rule was Philadelphia Orchestra
107. Id at 166.
108. See id at 165-66.
109. Cohen, 845 F.2d at 854 (explaining that the primary reason that a license to exhibit by
television did not include the right to exhibit by videocassette was that VCRs for home use were
not invented or known at time of license); Ettore, 229 F.2d at 491 (holding that television was
a new use compared to that of motion pictures, and that the plaintiff should not be deemed to
have granted a use not in existence and not contemplated by either party at the time of
contracting); see also Abkco Music, Inc., 838 F. Supp. at 157 (La Shelle rule should apply when
(1) parties could not have known about invention's existence, and (2) the possibility of such new
uses could not have been part of the benefit of the bargain); Rey, 990 F.2d at 1379 (if the new
use was not completely unforeseeable, Professor Nimmer's pro-licensor approach should apply).
110. 845 F.2d at 855.
111. Id. at 854 ("Perhaps the primary reason why the words 'exhibition by means of
television' in the license cannot be construed as including the distribution of videocassettes for
home viewing is that VCRs for home use were not invented or known in 1969, when the license
was executed.").
112. Bartsch, 391 F.2d at 154; LC. Page & Co., 83 F.2d at 198-99; Philadelphia Orchestra
Ass'n, 821 F. Supp. at 346; see also Abkco Music, Inc., 838 F. Supp. at 157 (La Shelle rule
applies only when (1) parties could not have known about invention's existence, and (2) the
possibility of such new uses could not have been part of the benefit of the bargain). Many courts
look to the sophistication of the licensor to determine whether she should have anticipated the
possibility of the new use. See infra discussion part IV.D.
113. Bartsch, 391 F.2d at 154; Philadelphia Orchestra Ass'n, 821 F. Supp. at 346.
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Association v. Walt Disney Co."' In 1939, the Philadelphia Orchestra
Association licensed to the defendant the right to use its recordings in
connedtion with the feature picture Fantasia.15  The defendants later
released the film in videocassette form and the plaintiff subsequently sued
for violation of the license."6 The plaintiff, relying on La Shelle,
asserted that its license did not cover this "new" use because "the
technology involved 'did not exist and [was] not even in contemplation at
the time of the 1939 [a]greement."'' ' 7 However, in attempting to find the
possibility of knowledge, the court did not focus on the plaintiff's own
knowledge, but looked instead to whether it could identify anyone that
possibly contemplated this new use."8
While the La Shelle rule is still discussed as an applicable factor, its
impact has generally not been decisive because some courts have gone to
great lengths to establish that someone, somewhere, contemplated the
contested new use." 9 If, however, one can conclusively establish that a
new use or medium was completely incomprehensible at the time of
execution, courts would either have to follow the La Shelle rule or dismiss
the rule altogether. Of couse, establishing that new uses are not within the
contemplation of the parties is practically impossible, as most new
technology has been predicted by someone before its actual existence. 2
As for interactive videogames, it is improbable that either party to a motion
picture license executed before the mid-1970s would have considered the
possibility of the motion picture being re-purposed into an interactive
videogame. However, it might be possible for a party or the court to locate
someone that claims to have contemplated this new use, thus making the
La Shelle rule inapplicable.
114. 821 F. Supp. 341 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
115. Id. at 343.
116. Id. at 344.
117. Id. at 346 (alteration in original).
118. Id. The court succeeded in finding the La Shelle rule inapplicable by claiming that this
use was not unforeseeable because "[a]s early as 1927, an inventor demonstrated his 'Phonovisor'
at a London department store using phonograph equipment to record a television signal on a wax
disc for playback on a mechanical television device." Id. The court then stated that "[w]ith this
evidence before it, a jury may easily conclude that home video technology was contemplated at
the time of the agreement." Il
119. Philadelphia Orchestra Ass'n, 821 F. Supp. at 346; see also Bartsch, 391 F.2d at 154
(finding that one reason a motion picture license allowed for exhibition by television was that
"'[during 1930 the future possibilities of television were recognized by knowledgeable people
in the entertainment and motion picture industries,' though surely not in the scope it has
attained").
120. See Dabney, supra note 44, at 92 (discussing the fact that "popular knowledge of a
technology may lag for many years behind its actual development").
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E. Bargaining Position of Both Parties
The sophistication and bargaining position of the parties to a license
can affect the outcome of license scope determinations as applied to new
technology in two ways.121 First, courts look to the sophistication of the
licensor when deciding whether she should be assumed to have known of
the possibility of a new technological use." Second, a few courts will
apply the pro-licensor approach" when the situation involves "over-
reaching or exploitation of unequal bargaining power by a licensee in
negotiating the contract."124  Therefore, when a court finds that the
licensee exploited her unequal bargaining power, some courts will construe
that license to include "only such uses as fall within the unambiguous core
meaning of the term... and exclude any uses that lie within the ambig-
uous penumbra."'" Additionally, some courts suggest that the pro-
licensee approach"2 should be applied when the situation is an "arm's
length transaction between sophisticated parties.... " Thus, the court
will allow the licensee, absent contrary intent, to "pursue any uses that may
reasonably be said to fall within the medium as described in the li-
cense."
' 28
When dealing with the question of whether a license for motion
pictures encompasses the new use of interactive videogames, a court should
consider the bargaining position of the parties to the license. Hence, the
court should first look to the sophistication of the licensor to determine
whether she will be presumed to have anticipated the possibility of the new
121. See, e.g., Rey v. Lafferty, 990 F.2d 1379, 1388 (Ist Cir. 1993).
122. Rey, 990 F.2d at 1391 (court looked to the fact that the licensor was an "elderly
woman" who was not represented by counsel during the larger part of the transaction); Bartsch,
391 F.2d at 154 (in holding that the plaintiff was deemed to have known of possibility of new
use, the court noted that the licensor was an "experienced businessman"); Ettore, 229 F.2d at 481
(in concluding that it would be unfair to state that the licensor's mind should have averted to the
possible new use, court looked to sophistication of the licensor). See also supra part IV.D.
123. See supra note 49-52 and accompanying text.
124. Rey, 990 F.2d at 1388 (court applied pro-licensor approach because the licensor was
an "elderly woman" who was not represented by counsel during the larger part of the transaction,
while the licensee was an investment firm experienced with licensing agreements). See also
Cohen, 845 F.2d at 851.
125. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 22, § 10.10[B], at 10-92. See also discussion supra
part 1V.B.
126. See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
127. See Rey, 990 F.2d at 1388; see also Bartsch, 391 F.2d at 154 (court looked to the fact
that the licensor was an experienced businessman in applying the pro-licensee approach).
128. NaMMER & NIMMER, supra note 22, § 10.10[B], at 10-92 to 10-93. See also discussion
supra part IV.B.
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technology that allowed for interactive videogames.'29 Second, a few
courts would also look to whether there was unequal bargaining power of
the licensee to determine which Nimmer policy, objective should be
undertaken to decide the scope of the license.13°
F Contractual Language
While it is impossible to address all conceivable contractual language,
two clauses are particularly important in determining whether a new use
should be encompassed within a motion picture license: (1) the future
advance clause and (2) the reservation of rights clause.
1. Future Advance Clause
A "future advance clause'" has been a successful vehicle through
which licensees of motion picture rights have argued for a broad reading
of the license to encompass a new technological use.'32 A future advance
clause is one that states that the licensee may exploit the licensed work
through "any means or methods now or hereafter known."'33  A few
courts have held that these types of clauses expressly grant to the licensee
the benefits of all future technological uses and mediums, and thereby do
not allow a licensor to claim that she did not contemplate or anticipate the
new use.)" In fact, even the pro-licensor court in Cohen v. Paramount
Pictures Corp.131 suggested in its opinion that licenses with future
advance clauses can confer "the right to... [use] films by methods yet to
be invented."'
3 6
129. Bartsch, 391 F.2d at 154; Ettore, 229 F.2d at 481.
130. Rey, 990 F.2d at 1388. See also Cohen, 845 F.2d at 851.
131. A "future advance" clause is a term given by the author to various clauses that attempt
to include within a license grant all possible future advances or uses. See, e.g., Rooney v.
Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 538 F. Supp. 211,229 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) ("by other improvements
and devices which are now or may hereafter be used"); Platinum Record Co. v. Lucasfilm, Ltd.,
566 F. Supp. 226, 227 (D.NJ. 1983) ("any means or methods now or hereafter known"); Tele-
Pac, Inc. v. Grainger, 570 N.Y.S.2d 521, 522 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991) ("by television or any other
similar device now known or hereafter to be made known").
132. See Platinum Record Co., 566 F. Supp. at 227; Rooney, 538 F. Supp. at 213. See also
Rey, 990 F.2d at 1389 (discussing impact of future advance clauses).
133. Platinum Record Co., 566 F. Supp. at 227.
134. Id. at 227-28; Rooney, 538 F. Supp. at 229. But see Tele-Pac, Inc., 570 N.Y.S.2d at
523 (reading license narrowly not to allow exhibition by videocassette even though the license
contained a future advance clause).
135. 845 F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 1988).
136. Il at 855. However, the court in Cohen required that the future advance clause modify
the specific right in question in order for the clause to be read to grant future uses associated with
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The case most often cited for the above proposition is Rooney v.
Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. 37 In Rooney, the plaintiff licensed to the
defendants the rights to exhibit his motion pictures." 8 The license stated
that the defendants could exhibit the films by "other improvements and
devices which are now or may hereafter be used." ' In holding that this
license encompassed the new use of exhibition by videocassette in the
home, the court stated the often quoted rule of future advance clauses:
"Where... a party has acquired a contractual right which may fairly be
read as extending to media developed thereafter, the other party can hardly
avoid the contract's application to such media by establishing that the
precise nature of the advance was not anticipated."''
In the analysis of the specific issue of motion picture licenses and the
new use of interactive videogames, it is important to note that a license
with a future advance clause will not automatically include such a new
use. 41  It may be possible for a licensor to argue that the new use of
interactive videogames is not an "advance" in the current media. 42
Instead, the licensor may argue that this new use is one that is not part of
the technological continuum of new uses of the preexisting media, but a
completely new and, more importantly, unrelated use.
43
2. Reservation of Rights Clause
Just as a clause in a license may operate to include a new use, a
"reservation of rights clause"" may exclude new uses from being
that right. See id. It was not enough for the court that a future advance clause was attached to
a right not in question. Id. See also Grogan, supra note 59, at 8 ("In Cohen, such a [future
advance] clause was not sufficient for the licensee to prevail, where the clause modified only the
licensee's rights of recording and reproduction but not its rights of exhibition and distribution.").
137. 538 F. Supp. 211 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
138. Id at 213.
139. Id. at 229.
140. Id.
141. See, e.g., Tele-Pac, Inc., 570 N.Y.S.2d at 522 (holding that the license to distribute
motion pictures "for television or any other similar device now known or hereafter to be made
known" did not encompass the new use of videocassettes and videodiscs).
142. See id. See also discussion supra part IV.C.
143. See Tele-Pac, Inc., 570 N.Y.S.2d at 524 (pointing out the basic differences between the
two uses in determining the new use was not encompassed within license with a future advance
clause). See also discussion supra part IV.C.
144. A reservation of rights clause is a provision in a license that reserves to the licensor all
rights that are not expressly granted to the licensee in the license. See, e.g., Dabney, supra note
44, at 95 (reservation of rights clause reserves "to the licensor all rights not expressly granted to
the licensee").
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encompassed within a license."14 Under a reservation of rights clause, the
licensor attempts to retain or reserve any right that is not expressly granted
to the licensee in the license."4  However, just because one drafts a
license with a reservation of rights clause, it does not mean that a court will
hold that the license does not encompass a new use.147  Courts may
interpret that the right to exploit new uses was, in fact, given under the
license, and therefore not reserved.'48 Thus, one must carefully draft the
granting language of a license with a reservation of rights clause, just as
carefully as one does with a license without a reservation clause.
The Second Circuit, in Bartsch v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc.,49
interpreted a motion picture license broadly to encompass the new medium
of television distribution, even though the license included a reservation of
rights clause.' The licensee was able to have the license include the
new use by arguing that the licensor gave him the right of future uses, and
therefore, the new use was not reserved.15 1 The court gave little attention
to the fact that the license had a reservation clause and stated in a footnote
that it could not "read [the reservation clause] as -standing for more than the
truism that whatever Bartsch had not granted, he had retained."'52 The
court held that Bartsch had granted the right for the new use, and thus, the
reservation clause did not have any effect.'53
In contrast, some courts have given reservation of rights clauses more
meaning and held that they help to exclude a new use or medium from
being encompassed within a license.'SA In Cohen v. Paramount Pictures,
Inc.,155 the Ninth Circuit stated that a reservation of rights clause "oper-
145. See Cohen, 845 F.2d at 854 (reservation of rights clause "operates to preclude uses not
then known to, or contemplated by the parties"); see also Tele-Pac, Inc., 570 N.Y.S.2d at 526 (the
granting language of the license was by its own terms sufficiently limited so that no express
reservation of rights is required.). But see Bartsch, 157 F.2d at 154 n.1 (reservation of rights
clause could not be read "as standing for more than the truism that whatever [the licensor) had
not granted, he had retained").
146. See supra note 140.
147. See Bartsch, 391 F.2d at 155 (even though motion picture license contained a
reservation of rights clause, court allowed for the new use of exhibiting by television).
148. See id. at 154 n.l.
149. 391 F.2d 150 (2d Cir. 1968).
150. Id. at 153, 155. The reservation of rights clause in Bartsch limited the rights of the
licensee to those "specifically... granted herein" and reserved to the licensor "all other rights
now in existence or which may hereafter come into existence." Id. at 154 n.1.
151. Id. at 154.
152. I&
153. Id. at 155.
154. See Cohen, 845 F.2d at 854.
155. 845 F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 1988).
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ate[d] to preclude uses not then known to, or contemplated by the
parties."' 55  Thus, in contrast with the court in Bartsch, the court in
Cohen allowed a reservation clause to benefit the licensor."7 Addition-
ally, it is important to note that a few courts have stated that reservation of
rights clauses do not have to be expressly stated in the license, and
therefore, may be implied.5 '
While a reservation of rights clause will not always operate to exclude
new uses, it can exist as a factor to establish that a licensor did not intend
to transfer the rights to new uses not anticipated or contemplated by
her. 9 Moreover, if the licensor is able to use the reservation clause to
help establish the absence of her intent regarding a new use, it may prove
very helpful."6
V. CONCLUSION
The determination of whether a license encompasses new techno-
logical uses and mediums is an area of the law that will continue to grow
as technology advances. Licenses written and executed carefully today will
invariably be questioned at a later date to determine whether they can be
read to encompass a new use or medium. This has repeatedly been proven
true in the area of motion picture licenses.
Little agreement exists among the different courts on the exact
methodology to be used or the importance of different factors when
addressing the question of application of licenses to new uses. This article
has attempted to organize the approaches and many factors that the courts
have considered when determining this issue.
The new medium or use of interactive videogames, unless intended
by the licensor, should not be encompassed within the uses allowed in a
typical motion picture license. Regardless of which policy approach is
followed by a court, the new use of interactive videogames is outside of all
156. Id. at 854.
157. See discussion supra part IV.F.2.
158. Rey, 990 F.2d at 1390 (stating that, although the license did not contain specific limiting
language, such a limitation was reasonably inferable for the general situation of the parties and
the general tenor of the license); Tele-Pac, Inc., 570 N.Y.S.2d at 523 (holding that the granting
language of the license was by its own terms sufficiently limited so that no express reservation
of rights is required).
159. See Cohen, 845 F.2d at 854 (reservation clause operated to "preclude uses not then
known to, or contemplated by the parties"). See also Grogan, supra note 59, at 8 ("Mhe cases
suggest that emphasizing your reservation of rights is likely to be of benefit.").
160. See discussion supra part IV.A (discussion that intent of the parties controls if
ascertainable).
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reasonable interpretations of a typical motion picture license.161 Under
the pro-licensor approach, a court should not allow the new use of the
interactive videogames because it does not fall within the unambiguous
core meaning of allowable uses of a typical motion picture license.16
Under the pro-licensee approach, a court should not allow the new use of
interactive videogames because the use is not within a reasonable
interpretation of a typical motion picture license due to the inherent
differences between the uses and purposes of the two media. 63 Further-
more, a typical motion picture license should not be interpreted to
encompass the new use of the interactive videogame because the interactive
videogame is not a mere improvement in the existing technology, but is
instead a completely new use of motion pictures.' 64 Moreover, this new
use could not have been anticipated or contemplated by either party, unless
licensed quite recently, because the technology allowing for this re-
purposing is relatively new.65 Thus, a court, applying any of the
approaches and factors analyzed above, should find that, absent contrary
intent, a typical motion picture license should not be read to include the
new use of interactive videogames.
161. See discussion supra part IV.B.
162. See discussion supra part IV.B.1.
163. See discussion supra part IV.B.2.
164. See discussion supra part IV.C.
165. See discussion supra part WV.D.
